The aim of this paper is to examine the evolution of Italy's territorial inequalities from and to consider what the Italian record tells us about the utility of theories of convergence and divergence. After outlining the scale and nature of contemporary development gaps in Italy, the way these inequalities have changed is explored, showing that convergence in the 1960s and early 1970s gave way to divergence, and identifying the respective roles of productivity, employment and demographic growth in shaping the overall trend in inequality. To examine what underlay the aggregate trends attention is paid to the comparative evolution of 20 Italian regions, indicating clearly the changing relative fortunes of the metropolitan north-west, the Mezzogiorno, the Third Italy and the Adriatic coastal regions. In the final sections several decompositions are employed to identify the contribution of productivity and employment growth across a range of sectors to the comparative performance of Italy's regional economies.
Introduction
Italy is a country with long-standing and deep-seated regional inequalities. Traditionally most attention was paid to the gap between the Mezzogiorno, comprising the southern regions of Abruzzo, Molise, Basilicata, Apulia, Campania, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia and, in some definitions, the southern part of Lazio (see Figure 1) , and the Centre-North, though with the publication of Bagnasco's Tre Italie (Bagnasco, 1976) Italy has a long record of compiling economic accounts for its regional economies. The main aim of this paper is to draw on Italy's regional accounts to identify the long-term trajectories of Italy's regions since the early 1950s, to identify the trajectories of Italy's regional economies relative to those of other parts of the country and to examine some of the proximate factors that underlie the contrasting economic evolutions of Italy's regional economies. In doing so, the paper will also contribute to the recent literature concerned with the question as to whether contemporary economies tend to converge or diverge and to the literature on the comparative performance of regional economies.
To these ends I shall first outline the conceptual framework that underpins this paper. In the second section I shall identify the size and nature of the gaps in levels of provincial and regional development in contemporary Italy, while in the third I shall ask how Italian regional inequalities have changed and whether convergence or divergence tendencies prevail. Most studies of comparative regional development are confined to analyses of statistical indicators that summarise the changing distribution of regional income and wealth. To go beyond this literature, in the fourth part the evolution of individual regional economies is examined. In the remaining parts of the paper various decompositions of trends in regional development are derived to enable identification of the respective roles of a range of demographic and economic phenomena and of the comparative performance of different economic sectors, permitting an evaluation of some of the recent research on comparative industrial development in Italy.
Catching up, falling behind, surging ahead and losing ground: trends in regional development
At the centre of this paper is the view that the comparative performance of regional economies depends on the relative weight of centripetal and countervailing centrifugal forces. At the most general level two opposite tendencies always coexist within capitalist economies. On the one hand, competition and the evaluation of investments are forces which lead towards an equalisation of the conditions of production and exchange, as enterprises whose productivity is less than average, whose costs are above average and whose profits are less than average seek to stay in the race by making changes to keep up with, or reduce the lead of, the market leaders.
On the other, the struggle to secure surplus profits and to accumulate lead to a constant differentiation of the conditions of production and exchange.
The quest for superior returns and the quest to stay in the race can be construed as attempts to upgrade. Such upgrading can result from several types of change. The first is improvements in productive organisation and technology that reduce costs relative to prices and increase market share. The second is the introduction of new products, or improvements in the quality or design of existing products, which permit increases in the prices the products command and/or increases in output. The third is switches to new functions/higher value market segments within the sector offering higher returns (Schmitz and Humphrey, 1999 ). An increase in all these three cases implies a movement of resources into activities that are associated with higher value added per unit of capital invested (equal to value added per person employed divided by the capital invested per person employed). In this paper these types of upgrading will be identified as relative increases in value added per head relative to the economy as a whole. To them should be added a fourth method involving disinvestment and a transfer of resources to new lines of activity which should result in increased output per head for the economic system as a whole.
Analytically, it is possible to identify forces that will lead to equalisation or convergence and differentiation or divergence. For example, the adoption by companies of similar technologies will contribute to processes of technological catch-up that will reduce development gaps. The speed with which technology gaps are closed will depend, however, on the nature of intellectual property rights the strictness of economic, political and cultural constraints on the diffusion of knowledge and knowhow. Conversely, circular and cumulative causation mechanisms associated with the interaction of scale economies, market size effects and external economies, as analysed in new economic geography models, will strengthen core economies relative to peripheral ones. The emigration of a relative surplus population from areas with low incomes per head will contribute to convergence through its downward effect on population size and its upward effect on wages in areas of emigration, provided it does not lead to comparable reductions in output (which it would not if, for example, human resources were not fully mobilised or the contribution to output of marginal workers were zero). Contrariwise migration adds to the population of areas of net immigration. As a result it will add to their population and may have a depressive effect on wages. At the same time, however, it may also remove restrictions on growth, and permit the realisation of potential scale economies. If, finally, migration streams contain relatively large shares of skilled people in economically active age groups, migrants may augment the human capital and reinforce the growth of the areas that attract them. Clearly, therefore, there are a range of forces working in opposite directions.
The outcome of the two counteracting tendencies (and of differential upgrading) depends on the relative weight of these tendencies and the conditions in which they unfold, and will vary over time and space and, indeed, from one spatial scale (and one group of enterprises) to another (Dunford, 1993 (Dunford, , 1996 Dunford and Smith, 2000) . In the theoretical literature, however, there are models that suggest, a priori, that one of these sets of forces will tend to prevail over the other. Early neoclassical growth models suggest, for example, that catch up will occur. In these supply-side models, growth depends on the growth of the volume of the inputs of capital and labour (but not land which figured in classical models) and the increase in productivity. Capital growth depends on investment, which itself depends on the availability of finance and savings (the savings ratio). Growth in the supply of labour depends on population growth, while increases in productivity depend on exogenously determined rates of technical change.
Technologies, it is assumed exhibit constant returns to scale. The conclusions are that steadystate growth will occur, and that, if savings ratios and population growth rates are similar, convergence will occur, as areas with low capital-labour ratios should grow faster than those with higher capital-labour ratios. This type of convergence is called conditional convergence as it depends on the existence of similar conditions in the economies under consideration. There are two reasons for this tendency. The first is that there are diminishing returns to capital. The second is that technology and knowledge are assumed to be pure public goods likely to diffuse.
Investment in capital and increases in the stock of capital per worker in less developed areas will, it is assumed, secure higher marginal returns and embody more advanced technologies that are freely available, closing technology gaps between more and less developed areas.
Much stronger and less qualified conclusions are derived from standard neoclassical models of regional economic development, which suggest that, once again in a world of constant returns to scale, the flow of capital to low income areas and labour to high income areas will lead to an equalisation of income per head (Borts and Stein, 1964) . Similarly neoclassical factor proportions explanations of trade suggest that regional specialisation and trade will induce an equalisation of factor prices in this case independently of factor mobility (see, for example, Armstrong and Taylor, 2000: 122-31) though in regions with a common currency adjustment would depend on wage flexibility (Dunford, 1988: 38-44 ).
More recent models of endogenous growth lead to rather different conclusions. Theories of endogenous growth were developed in the belief that cumulative historical increases in output per head are due to cumulative improvements in human knowledge and technology on the one hand and cumulative increases in human skill and knowhow on the other. Growth is accordingly a result of the cumulative impact of research and development, and of investments in plant and equipment and in education and training which are internal to the evolution of the economic system and hence endogenous.
What is also important about these models is the recognition that investments that increase human knowledge yield increasing returns. The reason for increasing returns is severalfold.
First, the fixed costs of the development of new products and technologies, that place enterprises ahead of the competition, can be spread over a large volume of sales, yielding strong decreases in average costs as output increases. Second, investments that increase knowledge generate strong externalities as knowledge cannot be perfectly patented or kept secret: once it is known that something can be done, others can seek to duplicate it, so that new knowledge has a positive effect on the production possibilities of other enterprises.
In theories of endogenous growth, it is also recognised that knowledge differs from other inputs in that the same knowledge can be used simultaneously by many people. At the same time simple replication enables equipment and goods that embody these ideas to be widely disseminated. Knowledge is therefore a non-rival good that can be used simultaneously by different people, and over and over again by the same people at close to zero marginal cost.
Nevertheless in market societies knowledge is also a partially excludable good as some degree of appropriability or excludability is associated with it. The reason why is that enterprises with sufficient market power and intellectual property rights protection can establish some degree of private control over discoveries, inventions and information that result from intentional investments and can earn monopoly rents on them. To summarise, in these models knowledge and technology are no longer viewed as a pure public goods but as partially excludable nonrival goods.
This conception of technology implies a move away from constant returns to scale and perfect competition to a world of increasing returns and also of imperfect competition. Applied to the study of comparative development, the models that result predict divergence rather than convergence, as new investments in places and enterprises that are already advanced create new development gaps. Similar conclusions stem from new economic geography models that seek to explain the causes of the location of people and economic activities. As Krugman (1998) has pointed out, much of this latter work rests on the idea that the evident spatial concentration of some economic activities is a result of increasing returns to scale at the level of the plant.
Increasing returns imply that goods and services can be produced more cheaply if production takes place on a large scale and is therefore concentrated in a relatively small number of places.
In a world of increasing returns, there are in other words strong centripetal tendencies which may, depending on the impact of countervailing forces, increase development gaps (for a fuller discussion, see Dunford and Smith, 2001) .
In arriving at these conclusions theories of endogenous growth and new economic geography models rejoin longer-established, but largely ignored, neo-Keynesian models of circular and cumulative causation. At the centre of models of cumulative causation from Young (1928) to Hirschman (1958) , Myrdal (1958) and Kaldor (1972) was the idea that there is a causal relationship between increases in the division of labour within and across industries and the associated creation of an interdependent and integrated industrial structure, on the one hand, and increases in output per worker, on the other. The reason why is twofold. First, increases in the division of labour involve, as Adam Smith had already indicated, a specialisation of tasks within enterprises and within and across industries. Second, increases in the division of labour also involve increased capital per worker, and, as investments complement one another, increasing returns to scale and the creation of a range of external economies. The second core feature of models of circular and cumulative causation is a recognition of the self-reinforcing interaction of increases in supply and demand. On the one side, supply-side increases in the division of labour, productivity and competitiveness depend on the rate of growth of output and hence on increases in the extent of the market and the rate of growth of demand. On the other, the rate of growth of demand (consumption, domestic investment and export demand) depends upon competitiveness and the efficiency wage (the ratio of wages and productivity Toner, 2001 ).
The outcome of these mechanisms is also affected by specific organisational, institutional and social factors. Setterfield (1997) argues, for example, that a particular industrial structure, capital stock, production technologies and skill profile developed over many years may 'lock-in' a region to a subsequent lower growth rate. Such lock-in can occur in two ways. Either the inherited structure may limit its adaptation to new and more efficient methods of production or may prevent an alteration in the commodity composition of output in line with the changing income elasticity of demand of its markets. In each case the consequence is cumulative decline as market share is lost. Other writers have emphasized the importance of 'social capability' (Abramovitz, 1986) or 'civic culture' (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993) in catch-up processes. Differences in productivity among countries and regions may create a potential for catch-up whose realisation depends on whether follower zones have the appropriate institutions and technical competence.
To this set of theories should finally be added another associated with neo-Keynesian models of growth and development. At the centre of these ideas is the argument, already identified, that growth reflects the role not just of supply-side but also of demand-side factors. As Harrod (1939), Domar (1946) and Robinson (1956) pointed out long ago, trends in employment, for example, depend on trends in the aggregate demand for and supply of labour. The macroeconomic demand for labour is the amount of employment required to produce the current level of GDP. More specifically, the number of hours of work demanded depends on GDP divided by productivity (GDP per hour of work). Given the average hours worked per employed person, the number of jobs can also be derived. Suppose that represents total employment or the total demand for labour in a particular year, the population, Gross Domestic Product, the average hours an employed individual works in a year, and the rate of growth of . As Equation 1 shows, the per capita rate of growth of the demand for labour, measured in terms of jobs, is equal to the difference between the rate of growth of GDP per capita and the rate of growth of the product of output per average hour of work and average hours of work per person employed.
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The aim of this paper is not fundamentally to evaluate these theories and models. Instead it is to ask, first, what actually happened empirically in Italy in the last 50 years and why. The answers will draw, however, on the growth accounting implicit in the neo-Keynesian models introduced in the last paragraph and will throw light on the utility of the wider set of models discussed in this section. The answers will also give some credibility to the view presented at the start of this section that there are two broad sets of forces and that the empirical outcome can differ from time to time and place to place, not least because of the impact of public policy on market forces.
Territorial inequality in Italy the mid-1990s
How large were the differences in development between Italian regions and provinces in the second half of the 1990s. To answer this question, Figure In 1997 the gaps in development between Italy's provinces were larger than they were in 1991.
In 1991-97 the most dramatic change concerned Treviso (Trentino Alto Adige) which rose from 27th place to 5th, while Gorizia (Veneto) rose 15 places, Rovigo (Trentino) 14, Potenza (Basilicata) 12 and Cosenza (Calabria) 10, though Cosenza was still no higher than 89th. The major declines were recorded by the industrialised areas of Lecco and Brescia in Lombardy (-10 places), Arezzo in Tuscany (-11 places) and large cities such as Rome (-7 places to 17th in 1998) and Genoa (-9 places to 18th). These data indicate strong relative growth of the northeastern regions and more generally of areas along the Adriatic coast with marked increases in Treviso, Vicenza, Gorizia, Bolzano, Rovigo and Verona in the north east and Potenza, where there was a strong increase in industrial value added (4 per cent), and Taranto in the south.
4 Catching up, falling behind, surging ahead and losing ground: trends in Italian regional development In the case of Italy the overall trend in territorial inequality since 1951 is depicted in Figure 3 (see also Terrasi, 1999) Table 1 which records the rates of net migration rather than the absolute flows by southern region). In 1960, the degree of inequality was close to its 1951 level. elaborated from ISTAT (1990) and EUROSTAT (2000) Figure 4 Territorial disparities in (apparent) productivity and employment rates, 1970-96.
Source: elaborated from ISTAT (1998) Variations in GDP per head can be partitioned into (apparent) productivity and employment rate elements (Dunford, 1996) . To examine the role of these two elements, Figure 4 plots the variation in productivity and employment rates, drawing on Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT) data relating to the number of full time equivalent jobs. As this data is only available from 1970 the graphs relate only to the end of the phase of convergence and the recent phase of regional divergence. The results are particularly striking.
1 In the first few years of the 1970s there was a rapid decline in productivity differentials.
2 In 1976 productivity differences increased sharply. In 1976-86 there were short phases of increase and of decrease of differentials. After 1986 the trend was essentially downwards, with the productivity gap in 1986 lying just above the gap in 1975.
The evolution of variations in employment rates differed markedly from the evolution of productivity differentials. Clearly it is not productivity differentials that account for the recent overall increase in Italian regional inequality, though productivity differentials remain a significant determinant of differences in the levels of regional development in contemporary Italy. Instead it is the very sharp increase in variations in the employment rate. An aim of the next two sections is to identify some of the proximate causes of this situation.
Regional evolutions
In the last section I outlined the overall trends in inequality between Italy's regions. In this section the aim is to examine the evolution of individual regions. The methods used are the ones employed by Blanchard and Katz (1992) to explore the ways in which regional economies adapt to shocks (see also Dunford, 1997) . Assuming an underlying exponential growth model, the cumulative rate of growth on a range of economic and demographic indicators for each regional economy is compared with the national average to see which regional economies grew more rapidly and which less rapidly than others and which increased and which decreased their shares of national output and population.
Expressed algebraically, the underlying exponential model is given by the equation:
where is the value of the indicator for region i at time , is the length of the period measured as the number of years since , and is the rate of growth. Isolating the exponential part of the equation, taking natural logarithms of both sides, and using the cancellation property for logarithms yields
In the case of the cumulative growth model
where the cumulative growth rate from year to is defined as
In our case, growth is measured relative to the national average, and so
where is the cumulative national rate of growth and is the cumulative differential rate of growth of region . Computing the exponent of the calculated regional differential growth rates gives growth of the region relative to the country, or the level a particular region achieved as a proportion of the level it would have reached at national rates of increase or decrease.
Subtracting the regional exponent from one gives the increase or decrease relative to the outcome that would have resulted from the achievement of national growth rates. 
Comparative development: 1960-75 versus 1975-96
As I indicated in the last section each regional economy has followed a distinctive trajectory. At the same time, however, there were certain broad similarities in the performance of groups of regional economies and some sharp differences between sub-periods. In this section attention will be paid to some of the temporal contrasts with the help of essentially graphical techniques.
So far most emphasis has been placed on the performance of Italy's regional economies relative to the performance of the country as a whole. A similar approach is adopted in this section. To contextualise the results, Table 2 reports growth rates for Italy as a whole. As the Table shows The rate of growth of GDP per head is identically equal to the difference between the rate of GDP growth and the rate of population growth. Algebraically if represents Gross Domestic Product, the population and the rate of growth of , , 1951-96 1951-1960 1960-1975 1975-1996 1951- and the other was Lazio. From the height of the columns it is clear that in Piedmont and Liguria the core factor was relatively slow output growth, whereas in Lombardy and Lazio, while output increased less than average, demographic growth accounted for a larger share of the decline in relative GDP per head. Conversely, the strong relative improvement in the position of the Mezzogiorno (a 14 per cent catch-up) depended primarily on a 9 per cent productivity catchup. The relatively slow demographic growth of the Mezzogiorno, attributable to very high rates of net out migration in a context of high rates of natural increase (see Table 1 ), accounted for a 5 per cent reduction in the gap. As the chart shows, however, the respective roles of demographic and output change varied from one southern region to another, and as Table 1 shows the role of natural increase and net migration differed quite markedly with, for example, relatively low rates of net emigration from Sardinia and from Apulia and Campania which contained the rapidly growing cites of Bari and Naples.
The situation from 1975-96 was rather different. In the north-west the relative decline of GDP per head continued but more slowly: while GDP growth remained beneath the national average, relative population growth also fell beneath the average. As Table 1 shows, the natural growth of the population of these regions and of a number of other regions in the Centre-North was negative, with deaths exceeding births as fertility rates fell beneath the level required for reproduction. In the Mezzogiorno, all regions except Abruzzo and Molise saw their output grow more slowly than in Italy. Only Basilicata had less than average demographic growth. As Table   1 shows, rates of natural increase in the South were lower than in the past, but so too were rates of net emigration, with the latter declining relative to the former. Overall the Mezzogiorno saw its GDP per head rise by 92 per cent of the national average, its GDP by 97 per cent and its population by 105 per cent.
To identify the role of employment growth the differences between regional and national cumulative growth are also plotted in Figure 9 . This figure relates only to the period 1975-96.
The areas that lost relatively were the regions of the north-west, the region containing Milan and Friuli Venezia Giulia on the one hand and a number of southern regions on the other (Basilicata, Calabria and Apulia). Strong relative growth occurred in Trentino Alto Adige and the Veneto in the north-east and Lazio. In the South the strongest relative growth was in Sardinia. In all of these relatively fast growing areas, relative employment growth exceeded relative population growth, raising employment rates.
GDP and population growth trade-offs
In the last section I pointed out that the rate of growth of GDP per head is identically equal to the difference between the rate of GDP growth and the rate of population growth. To examine these relationships, relative regional rates of growth are plotted in Figure 10 cases except Liguria, relative decline was due to the fact that relative population growth outstripped relative output growth. All southern regions except the one centred on Naples (Campania) experienced rapid relative growth, as did Umbria, due mainly to strong output growth, though its upward effect was reinforced by relatively slow demographic growth. In addition a series of areas in the Third Italy lay above average, though relative output growth, which was the dominant factor, was slower than in the Mezzogiorno.
The reversal after 1975 is remarkable. All of the southern regions other than Abruzzo and
Molise lie beneath the line, whereas all other regions except Piedmont lie on or above it.
Considering the regions above it, there are three broad groups. In the top left quadrant lie several regions with above average GDP growth and below average demographic growth (Veneto, Molise, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Emilia Romagna and Marche). Top right lie a series of areas where output and demographic growth were above average : Trentino Alto Adige, Abruzzo, Lazio and Umbria. Finally in the bottom left quadrant are areas (Lombardy, Tuscany and Liguria) whose GDP per capita growth was very close to the average, but above it, as relatively slow GDP growth was more than offset by the positive proximate effect on GDP per capita growth of relatively slow demographic growth.
The productive performance of Italy's regional economies: a decomposition analysis
To identify further proximate causes of the structure of and trends in inequality, there is a need to look behind the aggregate figures and the simple identities presented in the earlier sections of this paper. Table 3 , for example, presents several indicators of a number of constituent parts of regional GDP, of which several have already received some attention. In a different way, it
shows that there is a sharp productivity divide between the North and the South in particular, with more subtle differences between regions in these two broad territorial divisions. In the Mezzogiorno, productivity, measured by dividing gross value added net of an adjustment for financial services by the total number of employment units, stood at just 84.2 per cent of the national average in 1995, a figure that was slightly lower than the comparable figure for 1980.
As was also indicated earlier, a key factor explaining the divergence characteristic of these years was the decline in southern employment rates. The average for the Mezzogiorno fell from 32.3 per cent to 29.7, whereas in the North it remained constant, reflecting the South's more modest capacity to generate jobs and its relatively faster population growth. The fact that there has been little recent productivity catch-up in a situation in which there is a wide productivity divide is one of the results that has emerged from the earlier analysis. In part these differences may reflect differences in the sectoral profile of different regional economies.
The reason why is that, as the box and whisker plots 4 in Figure 12 show, there were wide regional differences in apparent productivity of labour between sectors. As is clear from the chart, in 1996 productivity was much higher on average in energy, with a median value of 174 million 1990 Lire, and credit and insurance (158 million) than in textiles and clothing (42) These contrasts suggest that, as a further step in discovering the factors at work in reshaping the relative position of Italy's regional economies, it would be helpful to examine some of the changes in regional productivity records and their underlying sectoral profiles. To this end I shall use several decompositions of regional productivity growth. (For a comparable treatment of Welsh regional earnings, see Cameron, Muelbauer and Snicker, 2001 ). The first decomposition, which is plotted in Figure 13 , splits actual relative regional productivity into three elements, of which the first two are plotted. The first is the amount by which relative regional productivity would differ from national productivity if the region concerned had regional productivity rates in each sector, but had the Italian average industrial structure. Called a 'relative productivity shift' factor, it compares regional and national productivity in each sector. Scores of more than zero indicate that on the whole the industries in a particular region achieves higher levels of productivity than the same industries at a national level. A score of 0.10, for example, would mean that differences in sectoral productivity would, controlling for industrial structure, cause regional productivity to lie 10 per cent above the Italian average. The second is the amount by which relative regional productivity would fall short of or exceed the Italian average if the region had Italian average productivity in each industry but retained the regional industrial structure. Called a 'composition' factor, it indicates whether the region does or does not have an advantageous industrial structure in the sense that it is or is not specialised in sectors with high productivity rates at a national level. Scores in excess of zero indicate an advantageous industrial structure. The third element is a covariance term.
Formally, if denotes regional and national productivity, denotes the ith region, and and denote the share of employment in each sector regionally and nationally, then
represents the jth sector, where , productivity in each sector, it would have an average productivity that exceeded that of Italy as a whole. At the same time its 'relative productivity shift' score was negative indicating that its industries did less well than the same industries in Italy. In the period 1980-96 there was a small rise in its relative productivity (1.04) due in the main to the upward trend in the composition component. An improved composition element reflected a move into sectors associated with higher than average productivities at a national level. On the intrasectoral relative productivity shift front its record was less impressive: over the period as a whole intra-sectoral productivity grew more slowly than average. Figure 13 A decomposition of relative regional productivities, 1970-96 Source: elaborated from ISTAT (1998) In the northeast there was strong relative growth. In the case of the Veneto, the dominant factor was its relative productivity shift. As its negative industrial composition scores indicate, it was specialised in sectors with productivities that were less than average nationally. Over the years this industrial profile became less adverse, yet the composition score remained negative.
Conversely the Veneto economy's productivity within these sectors outstripped the national scores.
In north-central Italy, Emilia Romagna also started with a marginally adverse industrial structure: if it had had Italian productivities in each sector, it would have had an overall productivity that was less than the Italian average. Over the years however this disadvantage was overcome, though its very strong intrasectoral relative productivity shift advantage diminished slightly. Interestingly a number of other north-central regions had an adverse industrial structure. Examples include Toscana, Umbria and Marche. All three however also had relative productivities that helped offset these compositional disadvantages.
Considering, finally, the South, what emerges is universally under-average overall relative productivities. In Campania, Apulia, Sicily and Sardinia, the dominant factor was a poor relative intrasectoral productivity shift performance. In Abruzzo, Molise, Basilicata and Calabria industrial composition played an equally or more important role. There are, however, some striking changes in relative fortunes. One of the most remarkable is the demographically small Basilicata region whose intrasectoral productivity shift score increased sharply in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
To go deeper, the productivities of different industrial sectors can be compared and their role in explaining the change in relative regional productivity can be identified. To this end the change in relative productivity can be split into a number of elements using a decomposition that is similar to the one set out in Equation 9. In this case the rate of growth of relative regional productivity is expressed as the sum of three elements. The first is an intrasectoral shift which is the change in productivity in each sector relative to the change in Italian productivity (where the comparison is of the change in productivity of each sector at the regional scale with the overall Italian average, indicated by the fact that has no subscript) holding employment shares constant. The second is an intersectoral shift which is the change in relative productivity associated with the change in the employment share of each sector holding relative sectoral productivities constant. The third element is a covariance term, not reported in the tables.
Formally,
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= Intrasectoral shif t + Intersectoral shif t + Covariance
As is clear from an inspection of Equation 10, the first element identifies the contribution of changing productivity within each sector relative to the overall national productivity change on the relative performance of the regional economy. An increase implies an upgrading in the position of the sector in the region concerned relative to the economy as a whole. An upgrading in this context means relative increases in value added per head through, as indicated earlier, improvements in productive organisation and technology that reduce costs relative to prices and increase market share, the introduction of new or the improvement in the quality or design of existing products which permit increases in the prices the products command and/or increases in output, and from switches to new functions/higher value market segments within the sector. The second identifies the contribution of the changing shares of employment in different sectors to the performance of the regional economy, holding relative productivity constant. An increase in this case implies a movement of resources into sectors that are associated with higher value added per head regionally. The size of this term depends on the size of the employment change, the degree of the productivity advantage/disadvantage in the sectors that increase/decrease in importance and the extent to which national productivity increases. The sum of the three elements for any sector identifies the contribution of that sector to the overall change in regional productivity relative to the national change.
In almost all regions the intrasectoral shift is far more important than intersectoral shifts (see Table 4 ), in part as negative and positive intersectoral shifts cancel each other out. The exceptions are a number of areas in the South where the respective contributions of these two factors were more even.
Consider first Piedmont (see Table 4A ). In Lombardy (Table 4B ) relative productivity growth was much stronger (1.23) . Once again service sectors played a leading role, though metal products and machinery (0.09), chemicals (0.08) and textiles (0.07) made quite large positive contributions to relative productivity growth.
The contribution of industrial sectors stemmed from strong relative productivity growth which was invariably offset by declining shares of employment. In metal products and machinery, for example, there was an intrasectoral relative productivity shift of 0.36 offset by an intersectoral shift of -0.14 and an associated fall in the share of employment from 15 to 10 per cent. In chemicals there was an increase of 0.14 in the intrasectoral productivity shift. In textiles it increased by 0.12, indicating a strong upgrading of this sector, in a situation in which its contribution to employment declined from 9 to 7 per cent. A different pattern emerged in the service sectors. All increased their share of jobs and were associated with positive intersectoral growth. The most striking example was other market services with a score of 0.52 and a doubling of its share of jobs. In this sector however productivity growth was smaller than the national average making intrasectoral growth negative (-0.08).
Other areas that achieved relatively strong productivity growth included the Veneto (1.17) and Emilia Romagna (1.12) (Tables 4C and D In the case of the South two important qualifying remarks must be made. The first is that the levels of productivity were much lower and played a significant role in explaining disparities in Italian development. The second is that since the start of the 1980s relative productivity differences have not changed much (see Figure 4) . Of course this outcome is in itself important as standard catch-up theories suggest that less developed areas will normally enjoy faster productivity growth than more developed areas due to the scope for technological catch-up. The
Italian evidence in this paper clearly refutes that simple proposition.
To illustrate the trajectories of southern regional economies I shall consider two cases also reported in Table 4 . In the case of Apulia (Table 4E) In contrast to Apulia, Basilicata (Table 4F) per cent of the national average, and if employment had changed at the national rate, declining to 822 full time equivalent jobs, the average productivity of Basilicata would have increased at 1.13 times the national rate rather than 1.26 times. The arrival of the car complex in Melfi directly accounted therefore for about one-half of the relative productivity catch-up.
Conclusions
Italy remains characterised by strong divides in the development of its regional economies. In the 1960s and early 1970s there was a strong process of catch-up in a context of strong national growth. Catch-up was due to a wave of investment in Italy's less developed areas that helped close the productivity divide, and the export to rapidly growing cities of the relative surplus population of less developed areas. After the mid 1970s the productivity gap closed much more slowly, while rapidly growing differences in the employment rate saw development differentials widen once again. The turnround coincided with a slowdown in overall economic and demographic growth. In spite of the continuing existence of a wide productivity divide, the regional economies of the South no longer experienced faster productivity growth than the Centre-North, while, as the neo-Keynesian models of growth discussed earlier suggest, the speed of accumulation was too slow to generate sufficient jobs for a population whose propensity to stay rather than emigrate increased.
The results of this paper went further, first, by identifying the respective roles of productivity and demographic growth in accounting for the trajectories of each of twenty regional economies. Analysis of these trends suggested that in the recent past there were strong forces that led to a concentration of investment and output and employment in some areas rather than others, with adjustment depending of the dynamics of labour markets and interregional mobility. In 1975-96 the areas to achieve strong relative growth were largely in the so-called Third Italy, though with significant internal differences. Similarly strong relative employment growth occurred in relatively few regions (Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto and Lazio). Many of the economies with strong relative output and employment growth were characterised by weak relative population growth.
In addition a number of decompositions were applied to analyse the roles of intrasectoral productivity shifts and intersectoral reallocations of employment in accounting for the reprofiling and relative upgrading of Italy's regional economies and for the productivity side of the trends in regional performance. Out of this analysis emerged a number of quite striking results. Two warrant attention. First, many of the Italian regional economies that have performed relatively well in the recent past were economies without a strong presence of sectors with high rates of productivity nationally. Instead in areas such as the Veneto for example positive relative productivity growth is to a significant extent a result of a strong productivity performance and a strong upgrading of certain traditional sectors, giving some credence to the idea that a core part of Italy's economic performance is connected with the aesthetics of everyday life. What may also be involved is a specialisation in the knowledge-intensive activities in these sectors creating some of the cumulative growth mechanisms suggested in the models of endogenous growth. Second, however, there is also important evidence of the economic strength of metropolitan cores centred on large cities such as Milan and Rome.
A great advantage of these decompositions is that they make it possible to assess the weight of sectoral evolutions in accounting for differences in regional productivity records. As a result they open the way to an examination of the locational, economic, cultural and political forces that may explain the underlying changes in the territorial division of labour. Attention was focused on a small subset of regional economies to illustrate some of the most striking phenomena. Not unexpectedly service sector growth made an important contribution to relative productivity growth. In the North, however, there were strong contributions from a number of industrial sectors in which there was strong intrasectoral productivity growth. A great deal of literature has sought to explain these phenomena. Very few attempts have been made, however, to identify the quantitative significance of these developments. The methods used in this paper provide tools for producing such estimates, while at the same time deploying methods which seek to move from aggregates to the complex realities that underlie them.
2028). I would like to thank three anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 2 Most of the historical data was kindly provided by M Terrasi of the Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, University of Pisa. 3 The most common indicators of regional inequality are centred on the standard deviation, the mean absolute deviation, and the Gini coefficient. As regional units vary significantly in size, however, all these indicators are weighted by the region's share in the total population. If denotes the population of the th region ( ), denotes its per capita GDP and denotes its GDP, the population-weighted standard deviation (WSD) is given by the equation As with the indicators based on the mean, the deviations from which the Gini coefficient was calculated were weighted by the product of the shares of the total population in each pair of regions. To facilitate comparisons the weighted standard deviation and the weighted absolute deviations are expressed as percentages of the mean to give a coefficient of variation (CV). 4 The upper and lower boundaries of each box mark the upper and lower quartiles of the distribution. The line in the box represents the median. The whiskers represent to the smallest and largest observations that are less than one quadrille from the box. Outliers plotted as squares are observations that lie 1.0 to 1.5 quartiles away from the box, while extreme values plotted by squares containing a cross are observations that lie more than 1.5 quartiles away. 
Notes
Romer: The logical sequence in my 1986 paper was to say that as soon as you think about growth, you have to think about technology. As soon as you think about technology, you have to confront the fact that there is a built-in form of increasing returns " technically, a nonconvexity. Notice that is all there in Solow‹s model. If you look at AF (K, L) you have got increasing returns in all the relevant inputs A, K and L. So up to this point, Solow and I are on the same track. You have to think of technology as a key input and one that is fundamentally different from traditional inputs. As soon as you think about that, you face increasing returns or nonconvexities. Then you have to decide how to model this from a methodological point of view. Solow said treat it as a public good. There are two variants of that. One is that it comes from the sky and is just a function of time. The other is that the government could publicly provide it. I think Solow had both of those in mind and it does not really matter which you specify. What I wanted was a way to have something where there are some increasing returns but also some private provision.
I wanted to capture the fact that private individuals and firms made intentional investments in the production of new technologies. So in this sense, the paper was very much about technological change. To allow for private provision, I used the concept of Marshallian external increasing returns. This lets you describe an equilibrium with price-taking but still allows you to have nonconvexities present in the model. That was a first provisional step. It was a way to capture the facts: there is some private control over technology, there are incentives that matter, and there are increasing returns in the background. What happened between 1986 and 1990 was that I worked hard at the mathematics of this and persuaded myself that the external increasing returns characterization was not right either --just as the public goods assumption of Solow was not right.
Whenever you write down theories you make approximations, you take short cuts. You are always trading off the gains from simplicity against the losses in our ability to describe the world. The public good approximation was a reasonable first step, but we needed to keep working and improve on it. The external increasing returns approximation was something of an improvement but the later monopolistic competition version (Romer, 1990) was the one which really gets about the right trade-off between simplicity and relevance.
